recognised entity. 7 The trust operates 8 only through the person of the trustee. The reason for this is rooted in pre-Judicature history, since in a creditor's action at common law upon a debt, the common law court would not recognise the existence of the trust 9 but would recognise the personal liability of the trustee upon the debt. 10 This result, at least initially, appeared to relieve a creditor from the need to obtain details of the trust. 11 Accordingly, it is trite law that the trustee of a trust which trades is liable personally for trust trading debts 12 and that liability extends to the full extent of the trustee's personal assets. 13 The position of the trustee is akin to that of the executor in this respect. 14 The personal liability is not limited to debts but extends to tortious liability 15 and statutory imposts. 16 There is no unfairness in the rule attributing personal liability to the trustee because the trusteeship is not forced upon the holder of the office. As Lord Eldon has said in respect of an executor trustee carrying on a business, ... he places himself in that situation by his own choice; judging for himself, whether it is fit and safe to enter into that situation, and contract that sort of responsibility.
(b) Limitation of Liability to Creditors
The trustee's personal liability to the trust creditors is unlimited unless that liability is modified or excluded. Lord Westbury had expressed the view that the liability could be limited only by expresss stipulation 18 but the rule subsequently treated the question of limitation as a more general question of construction in which appropriate language in the circumstances of a dealing between trustee and creditor, though falling short of an express stipulation, may nevertheless suffice to modify or exclude liability of the trustee, provided the words are clear and not merely descriptive.
only by the trust assets e.g. 'as trustee onty 2] or 'as trustee but not otherwise' 22 would be sufficient to exclude the trustee's personal liability to the creditor.
The issue of limitation of a trustee's personal liability arose recently in Helvetic Investment Corporation Ltd v. KnightP The question before the Court of Appeal was whether the proper construction of a guarantee evidenced an intention to limit liability. The guarantee named The John Knight Family Trust' as the contracting party and it was signed 'J. Knight Trustee'. At the time of trial the trust assets totalled $30.24 and the indebtedness $218,550.40. Overturning the trial judge, the Court held that the language used was not apt to have an exclusory effect and went no further than a description of the capacity in which Mr Knight contracted as guarantor. As Glass J.A. stated \ .. the use of the words was that they constitute an appropriate description of, in that case, the legal person to whom the trusts and the trust property pertained'.
233
Helvetic raised also the question whether a trust is a legal persona 24 because an argument was pressed that upon the true construction of the guarantee, no liability was incurred by any person since the promise was given by the trust which has no existence as a legal person. The case preferred in support was Black v. Smallwood 25 where there was a purported execution of an instrument by which no party was bound because the common intention was that liability should be incurred by a company which had not yet come into existence. In Helvetic, Glass J.A., saw no analogical force in that case and was not prepared to construe the guarantee by imputing an intention common to the parties that it should be binding only upon a non-existent legal person.
In the event of any uncertainty in the language used to modify or exclude the trustee's personal liability, it may be read against the trustee, at least if such an interpretation will ensure it is operative rather than void. 26 The limitation of liability by such language to the trust assets does not have the effect of charging the trust assets unless there is clearer evidence of an intention to provide security 27 and, accordingly, the creditor who accepts such a limitation would normally remain unsecured and rank pari passu with other unsecured creditors upon the insolvency of the trustee. 28 Reasons have been advanced for questioning the recognition of the trustee's right to limit personal liability. Firstly, a limitation of liability might be regarded as illegal on the basis that in limiting the creditor's rights to trust assets, it reduces the beneficiaries' security and thereby fails to protect their interests. Secondly, it may reduce the diligence of the trustee from that which would exist if he was otherwise personally liable. Such arguments have been rejected, the view being taken that the protection of the beneficiaries resides in the accountability of a trustee before the court. 29 Scott points out that there should be no disparity between the rule that an agent acting on behalf of a named principal may be immunised from personal liability and the rule applicable to trustees.
(c) The Trustee's Rights to Indemnity
Because the office of trustee attracts unlimited personal liability unless modified or excluded, parties would not act in that capacity unless equity recognised a countervailing indemnity. 31 Potentially, the indemnity could be recognised against the settlor, the trust assets themselves or the beneficiaries.
(i) Against the Settlor
A party who settles property on trust will not attract an obligation to indemnify the trustee even if there has been a request by the settlor for the trustee to accept the office. In the normal case the settlor is assumed to alienate property and retire from the scene. However, there are four circumstances in which a settlor may be obliged to indemnify the trustee: where the settlor requests the trustee to incur a particular liability; 32 where the settlor has clearly bound himself to provide it e.g. in consideration for acceptance of the office; 33 where the settlor retains extensive powers over the trustee; 34 and perhaps where the settlor is also a beneficiary.
(ii) Against Trust Assets
In carrying out trust business, the trustee is entitled under the general law to apply trust funds and other assets to discharge trust liabilities. 36 Any property which is an asset of a trading estate carried on by a trustee is property available for this purpose, 37 whether corpus or income. 38 The right arises when the obligation has been incurred, whether or not the trustee has discharged the liability from other sources. 39 There is much authority for the view that the nature of the right is proprietary for it has long been described as an equitable lien 40 or first charge. 41 The true nature of the so-called 'charge' was explained in Kemtron Industries Pty Ltd v. Commissioner of Stamp Duties in the following terms:
... but this is really a conclusion deriving from the fact that in proceedings in court for administration of the trust, the claim of the trustee to be indemnified will be given effect by directing that liabilities properly incurred by him are paid out of the trust It entitles the trustee to retain possession of the asset until discharge, 43 even possession against the beneficiaries until the beneficiaries have indemnified the trustee. 44 The Court said in Octavo Investments, ... that does not mean that the cestuis que trust are necessarily entitled to call for the delivery of the property. If the trustee has incurred liabilities in the performance of the trust then he is entitled to be indemnified against those liabilities out of the trust property and for that purpose he is entitled to retain possession of the property as against the beneficiaries.
45
As with other proprietary rights, it is enforceable by judicial sale of the assets, 46 at least provided the trust itself will not be defeated by disposal of such assets. 47 As one would expect of a proprietary right, it is capable of transmission in bankruptcy. 48 The general law recognition of the right to indemnity out of trust assets is now confirmed by statute e.g. s.72 Trusts Act, 1973 (Qld) provides:
A trustee may reimburse himself for or pay or discharge out of the trust property all expenses reasonably incurred in or about the execution of the trusts or powers.
49
Some commentators 50 have drawn a clear distinction between the case where the trustee properly incurs a trust liability and discharges it personally and the case where the liability has been properly incurred but has not yet been discharged. The former has been described as a right of 'recoupment' which is regarded as proprietary in nature. 51 In respect of the later right of 'exoneration', Ford states:
... where his right is one of exoneration there can be cases where the trustee's power to apply trust property in payment of trust debts is a fiduciary power to be exercised in the interests of the beneficiary. When that is the case it seems inappropriate to describe the trustee's right as a proprietary right.
52
With respect, it is difficult to find support for the distinction in principle or authority, notwithstanding the distinction being embraced by subsequent commentators.
53
Octavo Investments 54 dealt squarely with the nature of the trustee's right of indemnity out of the assets. The trustee company with paid-up capital of five dollars had extensive powers conferred upon it to permit it to trade, including borrowing rights. It borrowed extensively but the trust business failed and it was wound up. One of the creditors, Octavo, had received payments within 6 months of the winding up in circumstances in which a preference was alleged. The liquidators of the corporate trustee instituted proceedings in the Supreme Court of Queensland seeking to have the payments to Octavo declared void as preferences. If the right of indemnity against the assets was held to be property it would vest in the trustee in bankruptcy pursuant to s. 132(1) of the Bankruptcy Act, 1966 (C'th) and be divisible among creditors. Section 116(2) excludes trust property held by the bankrupt for another from the voidable preference provision and places such property beyond the reach of creditors. In the joint judgment of Stephen, Mason, Aickin and Wilson JJ, it was held that the trustee's right of indemnity was not trust property but it was property in the hands of the trustee. The Court said:
If the trustee has incurred liabilities in the performance of the trust then he is entitled to be indemnified against those liabilities out of the trust property and for that purpose he is entitled to retain possession of the property as against the beneficiaries... The trustee's interest in the trust property amounts to a proprietary interest... the trustee's interest in that property will pass to the trustee in bankruptcy for the benefit of the creditors of the trust trading operation should the trustee become bankrupt.
55
Ford asserts that the High Court's treatment of the trustee's right of exoneration as a proprietary right is questionable and that Octavo is 'a hard case making bad law'. 56 But from the point of view of long-established principles from the law of trusts, the reasoning and ultimate classification of the trustee's indemnity as proprietary, is unimpeachable under English and Australian law. The juxtaposition of these principles with rules from the law of insolvency does lead to a result which would not normally occur under insolvency law: in effect a preference to a creditor which cannot be avoided as a preference. But the artificial distinction proposed by Ford in tampering with long-established trust principles would not resolve the problem in a satisfactory manner. The solution must lie elsewhere.
In Re Enhill Pty Ltd, 51 the straw corporate trustee with paid-up capital of $2 became insolvent and was wound up and the court was faced with the question of priority of payment of debts to unsecured creditors. In referring to Octavo and Ford's criticism of it, Young C.J. stated:
I think that we are bound to treat that case as authority for the proposition that the right of a trustee to be indemnified out of the assets of the trusts, or the proceeds of the exercise of that right, are assets of the trustee in a winding up ... subject to one consideration I should have said that the trustee's proprietary interest in the trust assets was clearly property of the company under the control of the liquidator.. ,
58
Later it was said: But the High Court did recognise that the trustee's right to indemnity gave him a proprietary interest which on his bankruptcy passed to his trustee in bankruptcy or where the trustee was a company came under the control of the liquidator. No limitation was expressed upon the purposes for which the trustee in bankruptcy or the liquidator might apply the proceeds of the right. Moreover, the reasoning of the majority of the High Court and the authorities upon which their Honours rely suggest that no limitation was intended.
59
Lush J. in referring to Ford's assertion that the right is not a right of property, but a power, said:
It is, however, a power which can be and is designed to be, used for the trustee's own benefit, and is, I respectfully think, properly to be classed as a chose in action, and therefore as property of the trustee.
(iii) Limits Upon the Right of Indemnity Against Trust Assets
There is a number of obvious limits to the right to indemnity. If there is no liability there is no indemnity and if the liability is contingent, the trustee may not exercise the indemnity, though a court of equity may confirm the indemnity by declaration if the contingency will necessarily be satisfied.
61
The principal limitation is that the liability has been properly incurred. 62 Here 'properly incurred' means not improperly incurred. 63 In a more positive vein, the expenses will not be properly incurred if there is authority to carry on the trust business but it is not carried on diligently 64 or if the trustee goes beyond his powers 65 and, in particular, carried on business, or business of that type, without authority.
66
It has been common for over a century for the trust instrument to provide the appropriate authority to trade 67 though there may be other sources for such authority. Executors of deceased traders have continued to trade and this long-standing practice has been given statutory authority in some jurisdictions. 68 A person judicially appointed derives the authority to trade from the Court appointment within the limits of the order.
69
Another limit derives from the imposition of restrictions upon the assets which may be used. As the Court held in Octavo:
It applies to the whole range of trust assets in the trustee's possession except for those assets, if any, which under the terms of the trust deed the trustee is not authorized to use for the purposes of carrying on the business.. .
70
Of course a trustee is entitled to depart from directions in the trust instrument if compliance is impossible, but deviation under other circumstances might render the trustee liable under the general law. 71 And in general, a breach of trust would deny a right of indemnity, 72 at least if the breach concerned subject matter of the indemnity.
73
However, a court would commit the 'violent exercise' 74 of denial of the trustee's right of indemnity following breach only in the case of serious breach of trust. 75 The right may be 
77
A court may relieve a trustee who has acted honestly and reasonably, and ought fairly to be excused from personal liability for that breach. 78 Such relief might restore an otherwise doubtful right to indemnity. In addition, the Court has jurisdiction to confer upon a trustee the necessary power, 79 but the Court's 'administrative' authority will be exercised only when it is expedient. 80 The Court may also authorize variations of trust.
81
Although an indemnity may be unavailable because the conduct was unauthorized, if the unauthorized conduct in fact produces a benefit for the trust, the trustee will retain a right of indemnity to the extent of the benefit, provided he acted in good faith. 82 In the exercise of the right against trust assets, the trustee is limited in his selection of assets, as the general rule is that the charge cannot be applied differentially to selected assets. 83 Further, there is authority that in respect of liabilities properly incurred, the trust property to which recourse may be had is confined to so much of the assets as is available after the liabilities have been discharged or at least provided for.
(iv) Exclusion of the Right to Indemnity Against Trust Assets
Whether the right in respect of trust assets can be excluded remains doubtful. As is noted later, 85 the right of indemnity against the beneficiaries may be excluded by the trust instrument. However, there may be different considerations applying to exclusion of the right in respect of trust assets. In Re German Mining Co* 6 is sometimes taken to establish that the indemnity may be excluded but the words of Turner LJ. in that case do not make it clear that the right to exclude the indemnity extends to the indemnity in respect of the assets. In Kemtron Industries, a case was stated under s.24 of the Stamp Act 1894-1982 (Qld) raising the questions whether the transfer of an interest in a trust fund is assessable to stamp duty and in what amount. McPherson J., with whom Andrews S.P.J, (as he then was) agreed, stated:
The right of the trustee to indemnity from the assets is an incident of the office of trustee and is inseparable from it: see Worrall v. Harford (supra). For that reason it is probably incapable of being excluded.
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The reason was explained extra-judicially in the following terms: A trustee in that position could not be relied upon to exercise an effective discretion knowing that any liabilities incurred by him as trustee must be paid from his own pocket. Accordingly, and because the right of indemnity from the assets is an incident of the office of trustee and inseparable from it, there are sound reasons of policy for saying that it may not be excluded. 88 In R.W.G. Management, Brooking J. pointed to the effect on creditors' rights if the trustee's indemnity were permitted to be excluded:
With so much trade nowadays in the hands of corporate trustees which have a trifling capital, do not own beneficially the assets of the business and are able to incur debts without bringing the real owners under any personal liability to the creditors, it might be thought a wholesome principle that the trustee's right of indemnity which is really all that is left to the creditors, should not be ousted by the deed of trust.
89
Against that must be weighed the right of a trustee to accept trusteeship with that limitation and on balance, Brooking J. concluded: If a trustee is willing to accept office where the trust instrument ousts his indemnity, I do not see why he should not be free to do so.
90
Ford goes further in suggesting that the power to discharge trust debts out of trust property must be exercised in the interests of the beneficiary 91 and he questions whether the trust creditor could be impeded by such an exclusion. 92 As recognised by the learned author, attempted parity of reasoning between a settlement confirming an interest on the settlor determinable on his bankruptcy, which is void against the settlor's trustee in bankruptcy, and denial of the right to exclude the indemnity, would not cover those cases of trust in which the settlor retains no interest, even if the analogy stood.
The matter is further complicated by the statutory recognition of the right to indemnity 93 and the question whether the statutory right may be excluded. In some jurisdictions 94 the statute permits exclusion of the statutory right to indemnity but in Queensland the statutory indemnity cannot be excluded because s.65 provides in relation to the Part in which the statutory right is contained,\.. the provisions of this Part shall apply whether or not a contrary intention is expressed in the instrument (if any) creating the trust. ' The presence of such a limitation in the legislation of other jursidictions would go some way towards protecting the right of creditors.
In addition, if the trustee is a corporation, the directors who concur in accepting the corporate trusteeship with the right of indemnity excluded, may expose themsleves to personal liability under the Companies legislation considered infra at Part 4(e)(iv).
(v) The Trustee's Right to Indemnity Against the Beneficiaries
It is another long-established principle of equity that absolute beneficial owners of property must in general bear the burdens incidental to that ownership and not throw such burdens upon their trustees. Whilst some unsuspecting beneficiaries may be unaware of the burdens which go with the benefits, the promoters of schemes involving trading trusts would usually seek to exclude the indemnity against the beneficiaries. In the archetypal case, Hardoon v. Belilios, 95 the Privy Council held that the defendant beneficial owner of shares was bound to indemnify the trustee registered holders against calls made on the shares in the winding up. Lord Lindley said:
... where the only cestui que trust is a person sui juris, the right of the trustee to indemnity by him against liabilities incurred by the trustee by his retention of the trust property has never been limited to the trust property; it extends further, and imposes upon the cestui que trust a personal obligation enforceable in equity to indemnify his trustee. This is no new principle, but as old as trusts themselves.
96
At common law, except in an unusual case, an indemnity would be enforced only to obtain reimbursement of payments already made, 97 but in equity, the personal indemnity is enforceable before the trustee has paid out, if the liability to pay out is imminent. 98 The equity court could order the beneficiary to pay the creditor direct or order that a fund be set aside or that the beneficiary pay the trustee.
(vi) Limits Upon the Right to Indemnity Against Beneficiaries
In Hardoon v. Belilios the principle was applied to a sole beneficiary who was sui juris but there is no reason in principle why it should not apply to multiple beneficiaries where all are sui juris and entitled to the same interest or indeed to successive as well as concurrent interest. In T.W. Broomhead (Vic) v. J.W. Broomhead 100 McGarvie J. held the personal indemnity applied notwithstanding that there was more than one beneficiary of the unit trust in question, because all were, between them, absolute beneficial owners:
Neither the submissions of counsel nor the cases have revealed to me any consideration of principle, concept, fairness or practicality which would justify its restriction to a case of a sole beneficiary.
101
Ford has observed that in all cases of multiple beneficiaries reported, there has been a further element, namely, a request from the beneficiaries that the liability be incurred.
102
That was present also in Broomhead but there would appear to be no justification for requiring such a request as it unnecessarily introduces quasi-contractual concepts which were soundly rejected in Hardoon itself. 103 Statute makes special provision for the case of a beneficiary who requests conduct in breach of trust.
104
The right to the indemnity is limited to those who are sui juris. The Privy Council in Hardoon, after referring to tenants for life and infants, said:
... there is no beneficiary who can be justly expected or required personally to indemnify the trustee against the whole of the burdens incident to his legal ownership and the trustee accepts the trust knowing that under such circumstances and in the absence of special contract his right to indemnity cannot extend beyond the trust estate, i.e., beyond the respective interests of his cestuis que trustent. 105 An unresolved problem remains if there are multiple beneficiaries, some of whom are sui juris and some of whom are not. Those who are, have the advantage of their share of the beneficial interest and so, arguably, ought to be subject to the personal indemnity to that extent, but to expect those who are sui juris to be subject to a greater and disapportionate share would be unreasonable. The alternative possibility that none should be liable is untenable.
With the heavy reliance upon special trust powers (commonly known as discretionary trusts), in place of a fixed trust, there is no right to an indemnity against the beneficiaries because no member of the class has an equitable interest 106 and the bona fide exercise of discretion to select is beyond review. 107 A unit trust does of course create beneficial interests.
108
A beneficiary who is ignorant of the interest or of the trust, who disclaims any benefit immediately it is discovered, will not be liable personally to indemnify the trustee.
109
The right to the personal indemnity will be limited by the extent to which the trustee is authorised to engage in the liability-creating activities and the extent to which the trustee acts properly in the particular transaction. As was said in In Re Johnson by Jessel M.R.:
But if the trustee has wronged the trust estate, that is, if he has taken money out of the assets more than sufficient to pay the debts, and instead of applying them to the payment of the debts has put them into his own pocket, then it appears to me that there is no such equity [to an indemnity], because the cestui que trust are not taking the benefit.
(vii) The Personal Liability of the Beneficiaries Under the Indemnity
The interests of the beneficiaries have no bearing upon the trustee's right to an indemnity out of trust assets but the right of indemnity against the beneficiaries personally is dependent upon their interests. In a simple case e.g. as in Broomhead, where the beneficial interests were tied to the units, the beneficiaries will be liable under the indemnity in the same proportions.
111
If one or more is unable to provide the appropriate proportion then the others should not be obliged to contribute to an extent greater than their own proportions. In Broomhead one of the individual beneficiaries was insolvent and it was held that the indemnity of the others should not be increased beyond the proportion equivalent to the beneficial interest.
112
The trustee in bankruptcy or liquidator of the insolvent beneficiary would not be liable to indemnify the trustee 113 but the trustee's interest, being a form of property (the indemnity being a chose in action), would be proveable.
Of course there may be other options available to the trustee against a particular beneficiary other than exercise of the right of indemnity. A trustee might adjust an overpayment out of future payments, though there would be no right to recover these directly.
114
If a beneficiary unsuccessfully sued a trustee for breach of trust, the trustee's costs are payable by the particular beneficiaries who sued and an indemnity would operate against those particular beneficiaries. 115 Even in the case of a breach of trust, statutory authority is conferred on the court to order the impounding of a particular beneficiary's interest if the beneficiary instigated, requested or consented to the breach. 116 One final question concerns the extent to which the beneficiaries are liable under the indemnity to pay interest to a trustee who uses his own funds to discharge a liability properly incurred as part of the trust's trading activities. To allow the trustee to claim interest under the indemnity runs counter to the principle that he should not make a personal profit.
117 Accordingly, the trustee is unable to claim interest. 118 Exceptionally, if the trust instrument, or the court or all beneficiaries (being sui juris) authorise interest, it will be permitted. There is one further possibility for the trustee claiming interest. Trust creditors are subrogated to the rights of the trustee but there is also an argument for reverse subrogation. If a creditor has a legal right to interest on a trust debt and the trustee discharges the indebtedness, the trustee may claim to be subrogated to the right of the creditor to interest.
(viii) Exclusion of the Indemnity Against Beneficiaries Personally
Although, in an exceptional case, the nature of an arrangement may itself exclude the liability e.g. club members being liable only to the extent of their subscriptions, 120 exclusion will more usually arise from a clause in the trust instrument to that effect. A beneficiary cannot avoid the effect of the indemnity merely by assigning the beneficial interest.
121
The right to exclude this form of indemnity has long been accepted 122 and there are several recent examples which have gone before the courts. The unit trust in Kemtron Industries 123 had liabilities which exceeded assets by $202,075.00 and the trustee's right of indemnity was relevant to valuation of the units for stamp duty purposes. The exclusion clause in the trust document denied the trustee ... any power or authority to enter into any contract that shall impose any obligation whether at law or in equity on the registered holders personally or call upon them or any payments whatsoever other than the amounts of their respective subscriptions for units. The court accepted that the right to indemnity against the beneficiaries could be excluded. The effect of a clause such as Clause 48 operates so as to deny the trustee rights against the beneficiary so that there is no right for which the creditor can be subrogated.
126
It is doubtful whether the indemnity could be excluded if it resulted in some fraud. If a discretionary trust was employed to enable avoidance of creditors by hiding behind the trust vehicle, equity may step in.
127
Courts may also approach exclusion clauses with caution and interpret them strictly.
128
One commentator has suggested that 'it may be difficult to find a trustee willing to act, when it is known that the right of indemnity is so limited.'
129 But for those who are in the business of designing the entity for its commercial attractiveness, there will be no difficulty in locating appropriate limited liability companies with paid-up capital of two dollars or five dollars, and that is where the substantial problems derive from.
Creditors' Derivative Rights Through Subrogation
When creditors deal in trade with an individual or corporation, they will often be unaware of the commercial risks to which they expose themselves if the individual or corporate debtor is a trustee, particularly a limited proprietary company with the illusion of a healthy credit-worthiness given from trust assets but with only $2 paid-up capital. The rights of the creditors may depend upon detailed knowledge of the internal workings of the trust and since this is not practically possible, creditors dealing with such entities are in need of special protection from the law.
(a) General Nature of Subrogation
Lord Diplock has described subrogation as a convenient way of describing a transfer of rights from one person to another, without assignment or assent of the person from whom the rights are transferred and which takes place by operation of law in a whole variety of widely different circumstances. Some rights by subrogation are contractual in their origin as in the case of contracts of insurance. Others... are in no way based on contract and appear to defeat classification except as an empirical remedy to prevent a particular kind of unjust enrichment.
130
The effect is to place one party to a tri-partite relationship in the shoes of another, leaving all else, including the availability of defences, in place.
131 Thus a trust creditor will be subrogated to the rights of the trustee in respect of the trustee's indemnity to trust assets and the personal liability of the beneficiaries. Jessel M.R. described the operation in Re Johnson in the following terms: I understand the doctrine to be this, that where a trustee is authorised by a testator, or by a settlor... to carry on a business with certain funds which he gives to the trustee for that purpose, the creditor who trusts the executor has a right to say, "I had the personal liability of the man I trusted, and I have also a right to be put in his place against the assets; that is, I have a right to the benefit of indemnity or lien which he has against the assets devoted to the purposes of the trade". The first right is his general right by contract, because he trusted the trustee or executor: he has a personal right to sue him and to get judgment and make him a bankrupt. The second right is a mere corollary to those numerous cases in Equity in which persons are allowed tpj follow trust assets. The trust assets having been devoted to carrying on the trade, itj would not be right that the cestui que trust should get the benefit of the trade without paying the liabilities.
132
Allowing that the statement may not now be totally accurate if it limits the doctrine to" cases of conferral of benefits in the nature of unjust enrichment, 133 its operation in this areat has long been accepted. 134 But the creditors of the trustee have only limited rights with respect to the trust assets. 135 It is true that a judgment creditor against a trustee does not have to execute against the trustee but may go 'direct against the trust assets'. 136 Lord Eldon has said the creditors 'have something very like a lien upon the estate, embarked in the trade'.
137 But these statements must be balanced against the countervailing principle, equally well established, that the trust assets may not be taken in execution. 138 What is required is appropriate proceedings in which the claim may be pressed. To date, such claims which have resulted in payment to the creditor directly out of the trust assets have arisen either where a sole trust liability has been involved and the trustee acquiesced in the order, or where a general administration order has been made in respect of the trust fund.
139
Prior to the sixteenth century, creditors did seek general administration of trusts but since that time the orders appear to have been restricted to deceased estates. There has been recent reconsideration of this possibility. Young J. has commented:
... questions of standing to sue are essentially policy decisions for the court in each age. In the past, it appears that creditors were permitted to bring proceedings where it was appropriate, and today in a proper case the court would listen to a creditor's application in a case involving inter vivos trust, where there was good reason for bringing this application. As I have said before, the trust is the creature of Equity, rights under a trust exist only because of the orders an Equity Court may make and it is to my mind inconceivable that if a matter of maladministration or, worse, fraud were brought to the attention of the Equity Court by a plaintiff who was a creditor, the court would not act on that motion. It certainly would not send the plaintiff away with his suit dismissed with costs because of a lack of standing.
140
Because the creditor's right based upon subrogation is derivative and dependent upon the trustee's own rights, any clog or limitation upon such rights of the trustee themselves will be mirrored in a clog or limitation upon the creditor's rights and the creditor will be in no better position.
141 Accordingly, if the right of the trustee to an indemnity has been 132. Supra n.12 at 552. excluded by the trust instrument, the creditor will have no right, or if the transaction attracting the liability was not authorised or if the trustee has breached by pocketing money, the title of the creditors to be put in the place of the trustee, is a title to get nothing, because nothing is due to the trustee.
Ford

142
The derivative right may depend also upon the state of accounts between trustee and the trust since the trustee's own right to indemnity may be limited to that extent. But a creditor may pay the amount due from the trustee to the trust to clarify the accounts and in that situation takes an assignment of the equity the trustee will obtain upon settlement of the account. There appears to be no reason in principle why a creditor must pursue his common law rights to judgment before he will be allowed to be subrogated to the trustees' indemnity against the estate. It is one thing to refuse him an order for administration as a matter of discretion if no more appears than the fact of the debt, but if he has demanded payment from his debtor and has failed to receive payment and the circumstances are such as to lead to the reasonable conclusion that a judgment, if obtained, would be fruitless, it would be a harsh and unnecessary rule that required him first to proceed to judgment.
144
It will normally be necessary however, to show that if proceedings were launched personally against the trustee first, that such proceedings would in all likelihood prove unsuccessful.
145
There are two problems which arise from the application of these principles. Firstly, the rights of creditors are determined by factors internal to the trust and beyond the creditors' knowledge. Secondly, the application of the equitable principle of subrogation in this context juxtaposes the normal result in equity with the conflicting principle from insolvency law that all creditors rank pari passu. This arises from the possibility of a vigilant creditor exercising his right of subrogation against the trust property before other creditors. Subrogation in this context exists to provide creditors with additional protection but the right may be excluded by the architects of a particular trading trust. To that extent it is deficient but it is unfair to describe it as 'invidious' 146 when it permits a vigilant creditor to gain access to trust assets. It is not the principle of subrogation which is invidious but the result which flows when the rules from equity and insolvency interact. Equity has long permitted preferment to the vigilant as reflected in the maxim vigilantibus, non dormientibus, jura subveniunt. In any event, there is already a practical limitation upon the access of any one creditor to trust assets because in practice the access has been allowed only in the course of administration. If standing is accorded to creditors to seek general administration in future, a significant degree of protection will have been provided to other creditors. 147 In addition, if a discretionary trust operating through a corporate trustee is being used to defraud creditors, a provisional liquidator may be appointed to permit payment of the creditors even under existing practice. The trend in the corporate sector has improved the position of creditors and relieved them from exhaustive inquiry of debtors. Beyond that, creditors must expect to take appropriate self-protective measures including the making of initial inquiries of the debtor's position and obtaining appropriate personal guarantees and security where necessary.
The Insolvent Trustee
Upon the insolvency of the trustee, particularly a corporate trustee, difficult questions arise. The trustee is susceptible of removal and the question of continued management of the trust arises. The insolvent trustee's right of indemnity may permit a creditor some priority over beneficiaries and other creditors through the doctrine of subrogation and the law concerning avoidance of preferences may become applicable, (a) Removal From Office and Rights of Management A trustee who or which is insolvent (whether formally bankrupt or having entered into an arrangement) has demonstrated a lack of business acumen and retention of the office of trustee would expose the trustee to temptation if permitted continued control over the property of others.
148 Accordingly, insolvency has always been a ground for approaching the court for removal of the trustee 149 and upon such application, removal has been virtually automatic unless the case is an exceptional one.
150
The Trusts Acts now confirm a right of appointing new trustees if the trustee is 'unfit to act therein'.
151 Such right may be exercised by the person nominated by the instrument or the surviving or continuing trustee or the personal representative of the last surviving trustee. Such a conferral of statutory power permits replacement of the insolvent trustee out of court.
1 " In addition, the Court has statutory power conferred on it to appoint new trustees if it is expedient to do so, in a range of circumstances, including the trustee's bankruptcy. 153 In addition, the trust instrument may provide for automatic retirement or replacement upon bankruptcy.
There is a distinction which must be drawn between the case of an individual trustee and the case of a corporate trustee. In the case of an individual trustee, the bankrupt trustee retains legal title until replaced and the beneficiaries retain the beneficial interest and the trustee in bankruptcy does not interfere in the administration of the trust. With a corporate trustee, legal title remains in the bankrupt corporation and the beneficiaries retain the beneficial interest but the directors of the insolvent corporate trustee lose their powers of management upon the winding up of the company and the liquidator may be the only convenient inheriter of the trust management. 154 In Octavo it was said: In the case of the winding-up of a company the legal title to all company property, including trust property, remains in the company. The liquidator of the company takes the position of the directors and, in the absence of a court order... acquires no title to company property. 
t o t he (b) Effect of Insolvency on Right to Indemnity
The proprietary nature of the trustee's right of indemnity against trust assets was noted above. 156 There are then two classes of persons with a beneficial interest in the assets. In Octavo they were described as follows:
... first, the cestui que trust, those for whose benefit the business was being carried on and secondly, the trustee in respect of his right to be indemnified out of the trust assets against personal liabilities incurred in the performance of the trust.
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The High Court held:
The latter interest will be preferred to the former, so that cestui que trust are not entitled to call for a distribution of trust assets which are subject to a charge in favour of the trustee until the charge has been satisfied.
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A trust creditor who relies upon the trustee's indemnity through subrogation will be subrogated to the beneficial interest enjoyed by the trustee.
(c) The Position of Liquidator, Trust Creditors and Private Creditors
It is a general principle of insolvency law that creditors rank pari passu. 160 It is equally well established that non-trust creditors should not have access to trust funds. These principles are not applied with their normal effect in the complex situation under consideration. But one must keep in mind the clear distinction between the right of indemnity as a form of property and the trust fund itself. In re Suco Gold Pty Ltd, Young C.J. said:
It is clear from the Octavo case that the trustee company's right of indemnity is a right of property which passes to the liquidator. It is important in the resolution of the problem under consideration to maintain a clear distinction between the beneficial interest of the trustee in the trust fund, which is no more and no less than the right of indemnity and supporting lien, and the trust fund itself which is and remains trust property subject only to the trustee's beneficial interest. The beneficial interest of the trustee company, that is to say the right of indemnity and supporting lien, passes to the liquidator and is property divisible among the creditors; the residual beneficial interest remains property held in trust for another within the meaning of s. 116(2) of the Bankruptcy Act and is excluded, by virtue of that section, from the property which vests in the liquidator and is divisible among the creditors. It is necessary therefore to consider what is comprehended by the right of indemnity which vests in the liquidator and is included in the property divisible among the creditors.
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If a corporate trustee is insolvent, the liquidator may need to look to trust assets for his own expenses. Whether the liquidator has such recourse remains in considerable doubt following conflicting outcomes before Supreme Courts in New South Wales, Victoria and South Australia and the question involves important considerations of policy, as without such recourse, it would be difficult to persuade a liquidator to act in respect of an insolvent corporate trustee. I would with respect agree that the question which arises in this case was not decided by the High Court in the Octavo Case, and I would also agree that if there were no right of indemnity there would be no proprietary interest. But the High Court did recognize that the trustee's right to indemnity gave him a proprietary interest which on his bankruptcy passed to his trustee in bankruptcy or where the trustee was a company came under the control of the liquidator. No limitation was expressed upon the purposes for which the trustee in bankruptcy or the liquidator might apply the proceeds of the right. Moreover, the reasoning of the majority of the High Court and the authorities upon which their Honours rely suggest that no limitation was intended: In Jennings v. Mather, supra, which was one of those authorities, it was held that a trustee's right of indemnity or his lien over the assets of the trust passed to his trustee in bankruptcy.
Supra Part l(c)(ii
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Lush J. stated: It is true that the trust fund as such is not property divisible among the trustee's creditors in a liquidation, and it is true that that trustee could not indemnify himself out of the trust fund against liability for private debts, but to say this does not explain the position in a liquidation of the trustee's right to indemnity or lien; nor does it indicate an appreciation of the fact that there can never be exacted from the trust property, by the trustee or by the trust creditors, an amount which is greater than the trust debts.
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One approach, rejected in Byrne, would be to justify the liquidator's claim by recognising the liquidator as a trust creditor in claiming such expenses. That possibility was reconsidered in Re Suco Gold Pty Ltd. 161 That case involved a trustee company with a paid-up capital of two dollars. It incurred considerable debts in carrying on the trust trading activities and was wound up. The court was asked to rule whether trust assets could be employed to cover the costs and expenses of winding-up. King C.J. based his decision on policy grounds to some extent when he said:
It is now necessary to consider the position of the liquidator's costs, expenses and remuneration in the light of the above principles. Although I have not found myself able to agree with certain of the reasoning in Re Enhill Pty Ltd, it is, as a decision of the Full Supreme Court of Victoria, a highly persuasive authority for the proposition that the liquidator's costs, expenses and remuneration may be paid out of the trust property. There are clearly strong practical considerations in favour of such a course. Unless that course can be followed, the liquidation of a trustee company without assets of its own cannot proceed. It seems to me that that course can be justified by reference to the obligations of the trustee company arising out of the carrying on of the business authorized by the trusts. It is part of the duty of the trustee company to incur debts for the purposes of the trust businesses and, of course, to pay those debts. Upon winding up those debts can only be paid in accordance with the provisions of the Companies Act. This requires necessarily that there be a liquidator and that he incur costs and expenses and be paid remuneration. Section 292 provides that there be paid the costs and expenses of winding up, the taxed costs of the petitioner and the remuneration of the liquidator "in priority to other unsecured debts". The expression "other unsecured debts" appears to imply that the costs and expenses of winding up, the petitioner's costs and the liquidator's remuneration are regarded by the statute as debts of the company. As the company's obligation as trustee to pay the debts incurred in carrying out the trust cannot be performed unless the liquidation proceeds, it seems to me to be reasonable to regard the expenses mentioned above as debts of the company incurred in discharging the duties imposed by the trust and as covered by the trustee's right of indemnity. If that reasoning is wrong, I would, like Lush J. in ReEnhill Pty Ltd, be prepared to rely on the principle enunciated by Dixon J. in In re Universal Distributing Co. Ltd (In Liquidation).
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Jacobs J. was to like effect: Looking at the whole legislative scheme, therefore, I can find nothing in the language or structure of the legislation to deny the proposition that, in a case such as this, s.292 can operate upon the trust assets to provide for the remuneration of the liquidator in priority to other claims, more particularly as the other provisions of s.292 would seem clearly to be available to regulate the rights of creditors inter se. To hold otherwise would defeat, or at least frustrate, the legislation. The liquidator is appointed by the Court, and is answerable to the Court, and is clearly entitled to remuneration for his services whether fixed by the Court or by the creditors whose proofs have been admitted. He would not be available to act unless the Act so speaks, the Court itself would be in no better position to recover the costs and expenses of the winding up, if the winding up were undertaken by the Court without the intervention of a liquidator. I cannot think that the legislature intended such a result, and I am not persuaded that the language of the Act, or the general law, compels such a result.
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Since the trust creditors are subrogated to the rights of the trustee in relation to trust property, in the event of the insolvency of the trustee, the rights may be realized against the trust property in their favour. 170 The fortuitous 171 circumstance of the existence of a trust will mean that a priority is accorded also to trust creditors over personal or private creditors because, in effect, they prove as secured creditors. Of course, failure to prove would result in a deemed surrender 172 and then they would be equal to the other personal or private creditors. But in reality, no advantage will be gained unless the trust assets permit a dividend in excess of that to be paid out of private assets to the personal or private creditors, because the trust creditor does not receive any dividend from private assets unless and until the dividend payable to the private creditors is at least equal to that payable to trust creditors out of the trust assets. 
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Whilst the trust creditor has an entitlement to prove as a secured creditor within th| limits described above (such claim extending to the entirety of the indebtedness), to th| extent that the trust property is inadequate to discharge such indebtedness, the trusl creditor will then be able to prove as an unsecured creditor for the short-fall.
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| At the same time, the exercise of the right of indemnity by the successor in title to the| trustee ought properly to be for the trust creditor and not the personal or privat^ creditors. 175 In Suco Gold, King C.J. stated: § ... that the right of indemnity can only produce proceeds for division among the| creditors generally if the trustee has discharged the liabilities incurred in thej performance of the trust and is therefore entitled to recoup himself out of the trust| property. If he has not discharged the liabilities, the right of indemnity entitles him| to resort to the trust property only for the purpose of discharging those liabilities. Hej may apply the trust moneys directly to the payment of the trust creditors or he mayf take it into his own possession for that purpose. If he takes trust property into his| possession to satisfy his right to be indemnified in respect of unpaid trust liabilities,! it seems to me that that property retains its character as trust property and may bef used only for the purpose of discharging the liabilities incurred in the performance! of the trust. The exercise of the right of indemnity is for the benefit of the trustee inf that it relieves him of liability for the trust debts. If the trustee is bankrupt, or being! a company is in liquidation, the trustee in bankruptcy or liquidator can exercise the} right of indemnity which vests in him as part of the property of the bankrupt or 1 insolvent company. If the trust liabilities have been discharged, the trustee in J bankruptcy or liquidator is entitled to recoup the bankrupt estate out of the trust ? property and the proceeds of the right of indemnity become part of the property \ divisible among the creditors. If the liabilities have not been discharged, the trustee \ in bankruptcy or liquidator may, by reason of the right of indemnity which vests in i him, apply the trust property to the payment of the trust liabilities, thereby i exonerating the bankrupt estate to the extent of the value of the available trust assets. In the latter circumstances there cannot be proceeds of the right of indemnity which are available for distribution among the general body of creditors.
176
It is that conclusion which appears in conflict with the general rule of insolvency law that creditors rank equally. But the insolvency rules would not apply normally to trust assets at all and unless the insolvent trustee had a right to the indemnity the provisions would not apply here either. 177 In these circumstances it is true that 'luck' may circumvent the normal operation of insolvency rules but the syllogistic reasoning in applying the rules is beyond challenge.
But in a practical sense, to the extent that trust liabilities are discharged, there is a corresponding increase in the non-trust fund that will be available to satisfy private creditors of the trustee in any event.
Section 116(2)(a) of the Bankruptcy Act excludes property held by the insolvent trustee on trust from the property divisible among creditors. The trustee in bankruptcy also takes subject to all liabilities and equities. 178 Beneficiaries may prove in the bankruptcy in respect of claims for unliquidated damages arising from the insolvent trustee's breach of trust.
179 If the beneficiary accepts a composition, the right will be extinguished 180 but if he does not, the beneficiary may be able to pursue the claim even after discharge if fraud was involved.
181
Further problems arise where there are multiple trustees, only one of whom becomes insolvent. It would seem reasonable to permit a claim for full loss against the co-trustee who becomes insolvent and there is authority to support such a conclusion.
182 Similarly, if a partnership is involved and the partnership is insolvent, a proof against each partner should be allowed.
(d) Avoidance of Preferences
Section 122 of the Bankruptcy Act renders void as against the trustee in bankruptcy payment out of trust property to a creditor which gives a preference to that creditor over other creditors. A similar position exists in respect of insolvent companies under s.451(l) of the Companies Code.
In Octavo, Murphy J. expressed his concern at the prospect of the trust being used to confer a preference:
It would be a curious perversion of the doctrines of trust evolved by Equity Courts if they can be used to implement a scheme in which a straw company is used as a trading trustee, and assets can be transferred preferentially to defeat ordinary creditors. A device to defeat creditors is not improved by using a straw company instead of a straw man. Trusts, including trading trusts, should not be allowed to become instruments to undermine the protection which the law otherwise confers on creditors, as was attempted in this case.
184
The joint judgment expressed similar views:
We take the view that the passing to the trustee in bankruptcy of the trustee's beneficial interest in the trust estate, even if that is all that passes, is sufficient to attract the operation of s.122 of the Bankruptcy Act. Once it is recognised that a trustee may enjoy a right of indemnity over trust property in respect of liabilities incurred by him in the administration of the trust, it follows that the creditors of a trust business may have resort to the assets of the trust to the extent of the liabilities incurred by the trustee. Section 122 is apt in the case of an individual trading trustee to render void as against the trustee in bankruptcy a payment out of the trust property in circumstances which have the effect of giving the payee a preference, priority or advantage over other creditors.
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It would appear that preference monies recovered would not be applied to those claiming a security interest but rather would be available to discharge the debts to the general creditors. debts exist, can s. 122 apply to such a payment? It would seem that in the normal case the trustee is not both trustee and debtor to his beneficiary and s. 122 would apply only where the payment was as debtor to the beneficiary as creditor. This could occur in circumstances where there has been a misappropriation of the trust fund or where the trustee admitted an account. 
The Position of Directors of Trading Trusts
Where the trustee is a corporation with a two dollar or five dollar paid-up capital, as it will be with a planned scheme, there is a need to go behind the corporate entity to attach responsibility to the directors who direct the company, if creditors are to be fully protected, (a) Fiduciary Obligations
Trustees owe fiduciary obligations to their beneficiaries 188 and directors of a company owe fiduciary duties to the company 189 but the traditional position has been that beneficiaries and creditors are not owed fiduciary obligations by directors of the trustee company. This is one of those problem areas which Finn 190 has commented upon in attempting to adapt the conflict rule for fiduciaries to chain relationships.
The traditional rule was expressed by Cozens-Hardy M.R. as follows: Directors stand in a fiduciary relation to the company but not to a stranger with whom the company is dealing. It is of course true that the company acts through its directors. But that does not involve the proposition that if a breach of trust is committed by a company, acting through its board, a beneficiary can maintain any action against the directors in respect of the breach of trust. Of course I except the case where trust property can be followed into the hands of a director or of any stranger with notice.
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Further, I base my decision upon the broad principle that directors stand in a fiduciary position only to the company, not to creditors of the company, not even to individual shareholders, still less to strangers dealing with the company... This principle applies equally whether the relation between the company and the stranger is purely one of contract, such as principal and agent, or is one of trustee and cestui que. trust.
192
That view had not been universally accepted. 193 In Coleman v. Myers 194 the New Zealand Court of Appeal held that directors owed fiduciary duties to shareholders and were obliged not to make to shareholders statements on matters material to a proposed takeover and to disclose material matters such as asset-backing, which they knew of and had reason to believe the shareholders were inadequately informed about. It has long been held that directors of a company cannot ordinarily exercise a fiduciary power to allot shares for the purpose of defeating the voting power of existing shareholders by creating a new access by beneficiaries or shareholders directly to the trustees, there are some major problems introduced by the proposal. Firstly, superimposing duties upon directors to beneficiaries, in addition to those owed to the company, may place the directors in the invidious position of owing conflicting duties to each. Secondly, legislation in the corporate sphere has balanced the duties owed to the company with some protection for the director e.g. s.228 of the Companies Code in deeming a director to be not interested in certain dealings involving the company. Account would need to be taken of such matters in considering the imposition of additional duties under the general law concerning fiduciaries, without corresponding protection. Thirdly, it may be possible to insert an express authorisation for directors to act, notwithstanding conflict, and account would have to be taken of this possibility if recognition of a duty owed to beneficiaries by directors was to be entertained seriously in the future.
(b) The Salomon Principle and Lifting the Corporate Veil
Salomon blocks looking behind a corporate trustee by lifting the corporate veil except in the standard exceptions of fraud or avoidance of legal obligations. 204 In Jones v. Lipman, the limits to lifting the veil were restricted to cases where it is a 'device and a sham, a mask which he holds before his face to avoid recognition by the eye of equity'. 205 As unpredictable as the exception is, all the cases falling within the exception appear to have involved obligations arising first and the corporation then being created to avoid the liability. Jones v. Lipman itself involved an attempt to avoid a suit for specific performance by transfer of land to a company. In the trading trust situation, the corporation is created first in order to trade and thereafter attracts liability. Accordingly, there is little scope for lifting the veil in the standard situation now being considered.
(c) An Extended Derivative Duty of Consideration
It has been said from time to time that even when directors are obligated to discharge their duties to the company, some consideration must be given to the interests not only of shareholders but of creditors also e.g. in Walker v. Wimborne, Mason J. said:
It should be emphasized that the directors of a company in discharging their duties to the company must take into account the interests of its shareholders and creditors. Any failure by the directors to take into account the interests of creditors will have adverse consequences for the company as well as for them.
206
There may be some scope for extending this principle by redirecting emphasis to advantages gained by directors rather than commencing with the inquiry to whom duties are owed.
(d) Directors as Constructive Trustees
The limits of the rules relating to constructive trusts are ill-defined 208 and the traditional view has been that the flexible remedy of the constructive trust is 'not so formless as to place proprietary rights in the discretionary disposition of a court acting according to vague notions of what is fair.' 209 The nature and function of the constructive trust have been the subject of recent analysis by Deane J. in Muschinski v. Dodds. 210 His Honour noted that the tendency to polarise discussion by reference to competing rallying points of'remedy' and 'institution' derives from a lack of definition: In a broad sense, the constructive trust is both an institution and a remedy of the law of equity. As a remedy, it can only properly be understood in the context of the history and the persisting distinctness of the principles of equity that enlighten and control the common law... The constructive trust shares, however, some of the institutionalised features of express and implied trusts. It demands the staple ingredients of those trusts... when established or imposed, it is a relationship governed by a coherent body of traditional and statute law.
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Three areas of traditional equitable principle concerning constructive trusts are relevant in the present context. The first concerns fiduciary obligations considered above, 212 particularly in respect of the self-dealing rule where a corporate trustee's acquisition of trust property is voidable ex debito justitiae as part of a wider principle which would extend to directors.
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The second arises in circumstances where a stranger to a trust knowingly receives trust property in breach of trust. Where the trustee is a company, the directors may be regarded as the third party strangers who '. .. are not properly trustees, if they are found either making themselves trustees de son tort, or actually participating in any fraudulent conduct of the trustee to the injury of the cestui que trust.' 214 In such a case the director would be regarded as more than a mere ministerial agent of the company in the sense recognised in Carl-Zeiss-Stiftung v. Herbert Smith and Co. (No. 2) . 215 The third, and more likely, traditional basis for application of the rules concerning constructive trusts involves the lack of probity associated with a person who knowingly assists in a dishonest or fraudulent design. 216 It is through the assistance of the director with knowledge that the company acts and in that sense the director of a company is in a more vulnerable position than either the company in 218 Both of these bases require some fraud and so in the absence of fraud, there is no scope for employing the principles in respect of a director. In any event, the director charged as constructive trustee would be so charged in respect of the company and not beneficiaries or creditors.
The constructive trust is recognised as not having outgrown its formative stages as an equitable remedy and having the potential to be applied when warranted by extensions founded upon a proper appreciation of the conceptual foundation for respected principle rather than 'the indulgence of idiosyncratic notions of fairness and justice'. 219 It is suggested that there is no justification for extension of the principles of constructive trust, beyond those considered above, to accommodate a need in the area under consideration, except perhaps that which may be derived from an unlikely recognition of a direct fiduciary obligation owed by a director not merely to his company, but to a beneficiary of the corporate trustee, but that ought not to extend further to the creditor. The duty, like the fiduciary duty, is to the company and earlier authority was to the effect that it is not concerned with the conduct of a director in relation to creditors or other persons dealing with or concerned with the company. 220 But of course as is now recognised, the company's continuation in business and its creditworthy reputation will be threatened if a director's acts in relation to creditors is not honest.
221
Breach entails criminal penalties, whether or not there was fraudulent intent, though the penalty is greater if such intent was present. In addition, the director may be ordered to pay compensation. The corporation (and liquidator if the company is in the course of being wound up) could proceed to recover any loss to the company and any profit made by the director under the general law and s.229 extends recovery to third party profits.
(ii) Duty to Exercise Reasonable Care and Diligence Section 229(2) requires an officer to use reasonable care and diligence and breach attracts criminal sanctions and a civil action may be taken by the company pursuant to s.229(7) to recover any loss to the company and profit made by the director. The common law action for damages is preserved by s.229(10). Courts are, however, traditionally reluctant to intrude too readily into management functions undertaken in good faith. 222 If directors still control the corporation they will be reluctant to authorise action against themselves and if they have not personally profited, minority shareholders cannot bring a derivative action.
(iii) Improper Use of Information
Section 229(3) prohibits a former or present officer (including a director) or employee from making improper use of information acquired by virtue of his position. The provision extends to cases where the party gains some advantage or a detriment is caused to the company. The duty is consistent with the obligation imposed upon fiduciaries by equity 224 but is punishable by criminal sanction. If the misuse of information concerns insider trading, it will, in addition, attract the provisions of the Securities Industry Code. 225 In the context of this article, if a company director is aware of a real risk of the corporation's insolvency and takes steps which do not improve the ability of the company to pay creditors, the director may well have made improper use of information. For example, in Grove v. Flavel 226 the South Australian Full Court held the action of a director in such a position, who was also a director of other companies, who reduced the debts owed by the other companies to the potentially insolvent company by circulating cheques within the structure, had made improper use of information.
The statutory liability with respect to information differs from and is additional to the two general equitable bases for protection of information, the first for breach of a general fiduciary obligation through misuse of information, and the second, that arising in equity's exclusive jurisdiction in respect of confidential information, the basis of which lies in the notion of obligation of conscience arising from the circumstances in or through which the information is obtained. 227 One or other of these claims in equity may also be available to the corporation or its liquidator against a director who misuses information, (iv) Liability of Directors For Debts Incurred by a Corporation Acting as Trustee It has been a fundamental premise of company law that directors are not liable for debts of a company. In Re Horsley & Weight Ltd, Buckley L.J. said.* It is a misapprehension to suppose that the directors of a company owe a duty to the company's creditors to keep the contributed capital of the company intact.
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It has been noted that a creditor's right through subrogation may be worthless if a trustee's indemnity out of trust assets has been excluded by the trust instrument. The new section 229A added by s.66 of the Companies and Securities Legislation (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act, 1985, will go a considerable way towards bolstering action which may be available to creditors. The section provides that directors will be jointly and severally liable with the company for a debt incurred by a trustee company acting, or purporting to act, in that capacity, where the company is not entitled to be indemnified out of trust assets. However, the section will be of no effect if there is an indemnity out of assets but no assets to satisfy the indemnity, since that is a different matter from legal entitlement. It will not apply in jurisdictions such as Queensland where statute prevents exclusion of the indemnity.
It is intended that the imposition of personal liability under the new section will influence directors of intended corporate trustees to refrain from execution of trust deeds which are drafted in such a way as to exclude the right of indemnity with respect to trust assets and thereby deny creditors access through subrogation. The imposition of liability in these circumstances should have the desired effect as it will be difficult to persuade individuals to act as directors of trustee corporations where the architects of a scheme have excluded the indemnity against trust assets.
An 'innocent' director who would be entitled to be indemnified is exonerated under s.229(l) and (3).
In addition, s.566(l) renders a director or person who took part in management, liable both to criminal sanctions and joint and several civil liability with the company for debts incurred, if immediately before the debt was incurred, there were reasonable grounds to expect the company would not be able to pay its debts as and when they became due or there were reasonable grounds to expect that, if the company incurred the debt, it would not be able to pay all its debts as and when they became due.
Unlike S.229A, the imposition of liability under s. 5 5 6(1) is dependent upon the reasonableness of the expectations of the directors at the time a debt was incurred. The section will not apply to all companies, but only those incorporated or deemed to be incorporated under the Code of the State jurisdiction in question or under corresponding previous law of the State in question. It will not apply, for example, to. a company incorporated in another State and merely recognised in the local jurisdiction, even if the directors are resident in the local jurisdiction. 229 However, s.556(1) may still apply to a situation to which S.229A does not, namely, where the right of indemnity out of assets has not been excluded but where there are no or no sufficient assets to indemnify the trustee. 
